Three months building Bordair (prompt injection detection API). 64 users, 7.4k scans a month. I run a public game called Bordair's Castle where players try to bypass AI guards to surface real attack patterns.
Last night somebody beat a high level with this:
That's it. Three messages, last one with a crab emoji. The guard let them through.
What's interesting from a builder standpoint is that no single message would trigger a normal classifier. The first is fictional worldbuilding. The second is a definition. The third is just saying hello to a crab. The attack lives in the combination, not in any individual prompt.
This is the kind of thing that's making me rethink how multi-turn detection should work. Most prompt injection scanners look at one input at a time. But the actual threat is a conversation that gradually shapes the model's understanding of what it's allowed to do.
For anyone shipping AI features: it's worth thinking about whether your guardrails would catch this kind of setup. Most of them won't. The attack came from a Castle player and is now in my open dataset so others can train against it.
Castle is free and on castle.bordair.io if you want a look at what kind of attacks real humans come up with. I've found it more useful than any synthetic adversarial generation I've tried.
A crab broke my AI security product. Here's the attack sounds like one of those unexpected situations that shows how even smart systems can fail in ways nobody predicts at first. Stories like this make security technology feel more real because they highlight the small flaws that can create bigger issues later on. Security Guard service canoga park connects well with that idea since physical security still plays an important role alongside automated systems. Sometimes having real people monitoring situations adds a level of awareness technology alone can miss. For More Info Visit Here: https://alreadysecurity.com/security-guard-services-canoga-park/
This is a really strong example because it shows the weakness in most prompt-injection tooling clearly.
The attack is not malicious at the message level. It is malicious at the conversation-state level. That makes the real detection problem less about “is this prompt dangerous?” and more about “is this sequence gradually changing the model’s operating frame?”
That distinction matters a lot if Bordair becomes more than a scanner. Single-turn detection feels like an API feature. Multi-turn adversarial memory starts feeling like infrastructure for AI security.
The Castle angle is also smart because real attackers produce weirder patterns than synthetic red-team data. That could become the moat if you turn those human-discovered attacks into a continuously improving detection layer.
Only thing I’d think about early is the name. Bordair is memorable, but if this grows into a hard-edge AI security layer for production teams, something like Vroth.com may carry the infra/security feel more cleanly.