Hitting a $1.6M ARR plateau but refusing VC funding
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Christopher Gimmer, founder of Snappa

Christopher Gimmer grew Snappa to $1.6M ARR — then it plateaued. But he didn't want to take VC funding, so he let it ride and focused on new projects.

A few years later, it still pays the bills, but it's south of $1M ARR. And now, he's getting into the analytics space.

Here's Christopher on how he got here. 👇

The first small success

I actually started my career working as a financial analyst for the government, but quickly realized that corporate life wasn’t for me. I wanted control over how I spent my time. So, a friend and I began experimenting with different online side projects — everything from a student dating website to a guest list management system.

Our first small success was a Bootstrap themes marketplace that plateaued at around $10k a month in revenue. But after paying out commissions and expenses, we were only taking home a few thousand each. Not exactly life-changing. We knew it was going to be a grind to keep growing it and we wanted to build something more scalable with predictable — recurring revenue. That’s when we started thinking seriously about SaaS. 

That eventually led to cofounding Snappa, a simple graphic design tool for marketers and small business owners. The idea came directly from a pain point we experienced while running the marketplace — we needed a fast, easy way to create marketing graphics for blog content and landing pages, but the existing tools were either too complex or too limited.

We bootstrapped Snappa from day one and grew it into a profitable SaaS business that reached $1.6M ARR at its peak. 

Today, Snappa is still our main product that pays the bills. But we’re also getting ready to launch a new project called GoodMetrics — a cleaner take on Google Analytics that captures what people loved about Universal Analytics, reimagined with a privacy-first approach.

Snappa homepage

Validating the big idea

We had just launched a stock photo site called StockSnap and, once we had some traction, we wanted to better understand who was actually using the site and what they were using the photos for.

So I borrowed an idea from Alex Turnbull at Groove and set up a welcome email that asked one simple question: “What are you using the stock photos for?” Over 200 people replied, and the majority mentioned web design, blogging, or social media. That gave us a clear signal that a large portion of users were creating content — and could potentially benefit from a simple tool to help with that.

We didn’t stop there. For those who said they used the photos for blogging or social media, I followed up and asked if they’d be open to a quick Skype call. I ended up chatting with 15 to 20 people and used a customer development approach to learn more about their workflows — no leading questions, just listening.

A few common pain points came up again and again: Photoshop was too complicated, searching for stock photos took too much time, and even people with access to designers wanted to move faster for simple graphics. After hearing those same frustrations on multiple calls, we felt confident there was a real opportunity to build something better.

That gave us the confidence to move forward, especially since we knew we’d have some built-in distribution through a high-traffic blog post and a new stock photo site we had just launched called StockSnap.

Drawing a line in the sand

My cofounder, Marc, built the first version of Snappa on nights and weekends, and it took about four months to get the initial beta ready. Once it was live, we focused heavily on collecting feedback — both qualitative and quantitative.

A few things became clear pretty quickly. People loved having a built-in library of free stock photos — it was a huge value-add. They also really appreciated the simplicity of the tool, even if it was still rough around the edges. We also noticed that designing from scratch was intimidating for a lot of users, which made it obvious that templates had to become a core part of the product.

After fixing the major bugs, we found ourselves at a bit of a crossroads. There were still a bunch of features we wanted to build based on feedback, but we also knew we had to start charging to fully validate the product and support ourselves. So we drew a line in the sand: We picked a handful of key features that we felt were absolutely necessary, and committed to launching once those were done — no matter how uncomfortable it felt. Otherwise, we could’ve kept building forever and never shipped anything.

It took several more months to get those final features in place and set up the backend for payments and onboarding. Once that was done, we launched and started charging.

Technical limitations

Right after we officially launched and started charging, we realized we needed to refactor a large part of the codebase.

The first version of Snappa was built using PHP with JavaScript on the client side, along with a couple of frameworks to speed things up. It worked well during the beta, but as the product evolved and we started running into limitations, we knew it wouldn't scale properly.

That was super stressful—having just launched a SaaS, building momentum, and suddenly not being able to ship any new features for a few months while sitting on a massive backlog. And that wasn’t the only time we had to refactor; there were other iterations down the line as the product evolved.

But I wouldn't change anything. While part of me wishes we had built a more robust codebase from the start, the reality is that shipping fast gave us the traction we needed — and over-engineering early on could’ve just slowed us down or killed the momentum entirely.

Since then, Snappa’s been through a couple of iterations, and it’s now built on Node.js. We host everything across Amazon AWS and DigitalOcean.

Built-in distribution

We were able to get our first wave of users by tapping into existing audiences we had already built. We had a blog post on BootstrapBay that was getting a lot of traffic, and we had also launched StockSnap, which was starting to gain traction as a free stock photo resource. We used both of those channels to promote Snappa at launch, which gave us some much-needed initial momentum.

Our first real marketing challenge came once we’d tapped out that initial audience. Traffic started to slow down, and we knew we had to find a more scalable channel if we wanted to keep growing.

A content flywheel

From there, most of our growth came through content marketing and SEO. And rather than randomly publishing blog posts, we built a marketing flywheel where every piece of content played a role in attracting the right audience and moving them closer to a signup.

For example, we created blog posts around high-intent search queries like “Facebook cover photo size” or “Twitter header dimensions.” These posts brought in people actively trying to create social media graphics. From there, we linked directly to targeted landing pages focused on that specific use case — like our Facebook cover maker or Twitter header templates. Those landing pages, in turn, linked to Snappa’s editor and template library, creating a smooth funnel from search to signup.

What made the flywheel so powerful was how everything reinforced everything else. A single blog post or landing page on its own might not move the needle, but collectively, they created a content ecosystem that built momentum. As some posts started to rank and earn backlinks, our domain authority improved, making it easier for future content to rank well. That brought in more traffic, more users, and more word-of-mouth exposure.

A data-first approach

We don’t just look at traffic — we measure how well each piece of content contributes to actual signups and revenue. We set up custom events in our analytics for free signups and paid upgrades, and then we break down performance by initial landing page. This gives us a clear view of how people first discovered us and which pages are driving the most conversions.

For example, we can look at a specific blog post or landing page and see how many free trials it generated and how many of those converted to paid plans. That data helps us decide where to focus our efforts. If a page is driving a high volume of signups and converting well, we’ll double down on it — improve the content, build more backlinks, and try to move it up in the rankings.

This kind of measurement used to be easy with Universal Analytics, but GA4 made it more complex and time-consuming to get those same insights. That frustration was actually one of the reasons we decided to build GoodMetrics. We now use it to track content performance for Snappa, and it’s been a huge improvement in terms of clarity and workflow.

The growth plateau

Growth wasn’t explosive, but it became more predictable and sustainable the longer we stuck with it. Until 2021, when we hit a plateau. Now, we're below $1M ARR.

I think that came down to a few things: Struggling to find new scalable marketing channels beyond SEO, increased competition from well-funded companies, and a shift toward video content — which impacted the use cases for a tool like Snappa.

We tried doubling down on things that were working but, ultimately, we kind of accepted the plateau as a natural stage in the product's lifecycle. We knew that if we wanted to break through it, we'd have to pivot the product to support video, or raise a round of funding to compete head-on with Canva. Neither option seemed that appealing to us.

Instead, we just kept operating it as a profitable business and started focusing on other opportunities. For example, we built Bitbo in 2022, which we ended up selling a year later. And now, we're launching GoodMetrics.

If there’s one thing I’d do differently, it would be staying even more focused on the core business once we had product-market fit.

It’s emotionally tough to run a business that’s plateauing or declining, and it kills your valuation too. If we’d been more proactive about evolving the product or exploring adjacent opportunities sooner, we might have been able to extend the growth curve a bit longer.

Start small

If you're just getting started, I like the concept of stair stepping your way to progressively more ambitious projects. You don’t need to launch a full-blown SaaS on day one.

I started with smaller projects — like selling Bootstrap themes and launching StockSnap — and those earlier wins gave me the experience, confidence, and even distribution channels that helped make Snappa successful. Every step was a building block.

Also, don’t overlook distribution. A great product is only half the battle — if no one knows about it, it doesn’t matter. In our case, we had some built-in traffic from earlier projects, and later we leaned heavily on content and SEO to scale. So if you’re building something, think early on about how people will actually find it.

And finally, don’t wait until everything is perfect to launch. Ship something useful, listen to users, and keep improving it. That feedback loop is way more valuable than trying to nail everything upfront.

What's next?

Right now, our main focus is on launching and growing GoodMetrics. Our main goal is to hit $1M+ in ARR like we did with Snappa — but ideally, we’d like to make it an even bigger business over time. We think there’s a real opportunity to build something long lasting in the analytics space.

Beyond that, I’m at a stage in my life where I’m optimizing for freedom more than non-stop grinding. I want to get to a point where I have the flexibility to work on whatever projects interest me — without needing to think about whether they’ll make money or not.

Building calm, profitable businesses is still the goal, but it's just as much about enjoying the process as it is about the outcome.

You can follow me on X or visit my personal site. I haven't posted there in a while, but you can check out my archive of past writing. And if you're looking for a better alternative to GA4, join the waitlist at GoodMetrics.io.

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About the Author

Photo of James Fleischmann James Fleischmann

I've been writing for Indie Hackers for the better part of a decade. In that time, I've interviewed hundreds of startup founders about their wins, losses, and lessons. I'm also the cofounder of dbrief (AI interview assistant) and LoomFlows (customer feedback via Loom). And I write two newsletters: SaaS Watch (micro-SaaS acquisition opportunities) and Ancient Beat (archaeo/anthro news).

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  1. 2

    I dislike VC money too. I am in a similar situation. Solo founder 1.2M ARR. Would love to connect to similar founders. I run 2 saas business. 1. CyberSecurity / 2. Affiliate Tracking Platform.

    @christopher - I would love to connect and discuss if we can help each other. Anyone else who is bootstrapped and has significant traction. I would also love to connect. The hard part is the contacts, to figure out what works / what not etc.

    We dont need VCs to dictate our lives. Lets stick together and make things work.

    1. 1

      Solo founder with $1.2M ARR is mad impressive Sven! Happy to connect, feel free to DM me here or on X.

    2. 1

      Would love to connect, Also bootstrapped and would love to explore how we can help each other

  2. 2

    This is an incredibly inspiring and detailed journey — love how Christopher emphasizes the importance of validation, starting small, and leaning into distribution channels. His focus on a data-first approach and adaptability through plateaus really resonate. Excited to see how GoodMetrics evolves and how he balances growth with sustainability. Thanks for sharing this valuable insight!

  3. 2

    This was such an inspiring read – love the realness of your path. That early grind with the Bootstrap marketplace and then pivoting to Snappa makes total sense in hindsight. I also really appreciate how the idea for Snappa came directly from a pain point you actually had — that’s the best kind of validation.

    Excited to hear more about GoodMetrics. The timing feels perfect with how bloated GA has become. Will you be focusing mainly on bootstrappers / indie founders, or also aiming for agencies?

    1. 1

      We're building it out for both solo founders and agencies alike. You'll be able to set user permissions at both the organization and the website level so agencies can share only certain websites with their clients and vice versa.

  4. 2

    Hey Christopher!

    I was just wondering, did you ever use Universal Analytics for your SaaS? I have my doubts. I feel like it misses the mark when trying to connect a user's first visit to a blog post with their subsequent product upgrades. I actually wrote a blog post about this. If you search for "ga4 for SaaS" on Google, you should be able to find it!

    Honestly, I’m not too sure that your current strategy is going to bring you the results you're aiming for. While Universal Analytics might have its strengths for e-commerce, there are other tools like Mixpanel, Amplitude, and PostHog that might be a better fit for companies focused on product development. After working in this industry for over 12 years and chatting with countless SaaS founders, I’ve heard a lot of frustration with UA and how it doesn’t really help in driving growth.

    1. 1

      Hey Ihar,

      We actually used Mixpanel while building Snappa as we found it easier to connect upgrades with a user's first point of contact. However, we now get that same functionality with GoodMetrics so we've ditched Mixpanel altogether. We found the 'product analytics' side of things was overkill for our needs. I think product analytics can be useful if you have a ton of data and you know what you're looking for. But often times (especially for smaller teams/companies), it ends up just being a distraction.

      1. 1

        Hey Chris,

        • What is your strategy for achieving GDPR compliance without pushing your clients to show a cookie banner to create user profiles in GoodMetrics? Additionally, how will you link the initial contact with the upgrade since it requires linking users (a.k.a. user profile or cookies)? Currently, based on the information provided, your product does not address these concerns.

        • "I think product analytics can be useful if you have a ton of data and you know what you're looking for. But often times (especially for smaller teams/companies), it ends up just being a distraction." - It's a distraction for you because you tracked a lot of data, which was initially a bad decision. To avoid distraction, you should focus only on the core users' actions, not every data point. You can read my blog post https://www.vakulski-group.com/blog/essay/why-should-you-have-fewer-metrics/

        Ihar

  5. 1

    Plateauing seems inevitable for many bootstrapped SaaS products. For those here who’ve been through it, did you double down on the product, pivot, or just let it run? What actually worked to break through?

  6. 1

    Respect to Christopher for staying true to his vision. Scaling to $1.6M ARR without VC is no small feat. Sometimes letting a profitable product plateau while you explore new ideas is the smartest move — especially when freedom and ownership matter more than chasing exponential growth. 👏🔥

  7. 1

    Thanks for sharing your story, nice read! Love the way you kept pushing yourself and say 100% independent. Props

  8. 1

    Bootstrapped brilliance at its finest! Hitting $1.6M ARR without VC proves that passion, grit, and control still win in the startup game.

  9. 1

    ¡Gran historia, Christopher!
    Me parece admirable cómo decidiste no tomar financiación externa y preferiste mantener el control total, incluso si eso significaba dejar que el crecimiento se estabilizara. Mucha gente siente presión por “escalar o morir”, y ver que Snappa sigue pagando las cuentas años después muestra que un negocio sostenible a largo plazo también es una gran victoria.

    Estoy especialmente interesado en GoodMetrics. Yo también estoy trabajando en un proyecto propio con enfoque en estudiantes y uso de IA, así que ver cómo pivotas hacia algo más técnico (y necesario) como la analítica web me inspira bastante.

    Gracias por compartir con tanta claridad el camino. ¡Estaré pendiente del lanzamiento de GoodMetrics!

  10. 1

    Christopher, your story resonates with many of us who value independence over rapid scaling. Hitting a $1.6M ARR plateau is still an impressive achievement, especially without VC funding. What strategies are you employing to break through this plateau? Are you focusing on new customer acquisition, product expansion, or perhaps improving retention? I'm also interested in how you manage cash flow and reinvestment at this stage. Do you have a specific percentage of revenue that you reinvest into growth, or is it more opportunistic? Your decision to focus on new projects while maintaining Snappa is intriguing. How do you balance your time and resources between the existing business and new ventures? It's great to see someone prioritizing sustainability over growth at all costs. Kudos!

  11. 1

    I like how you started small and based on the market dynamics and user feedback built and launched a product that was relevant to your target customer. Bravo

  12. 1

    Achieving $1.6M ARR without VC funding shows disciplined growth, product-market fit, and founder resilience. In contrast to rapid scaling, it emphasizes control, sustainability, and long-term value.

  13. 1

    Very insightful. I can relate so much yo your story despite the fact that we have not hit the plateau yet (1,2M ARR).

  14. 1

    No fundraising, no bullsh*t promises - just product, SEO and a lot of common sense.

    Snappa reached $1.6M ARR without a VC, then plateaued. He could have forced growth, but he chose the sustainable path. Today, he's bouncing back with GoodMetrics, an analytics tool focused on clarity and privacy.

    💡 Key lesson:

    Start small. Build calm. Scale with intention.

    A bootstrapping masterclass

  15. 1

    This is a good product.

    Why not add AI? Many similar tools have seen new growth opportunities by incorporating AI.

    1. 1

      We thought about it but I think it's ultimately going to be a race to the bottom and we'd be competing with some deep-pocketed competitors. At this point, I'd rather work on something that's a bit more defensible where we have more of an advantage.

  16. 1

    As a founder in a similar place, this was really helpful. I have recently heard some horror stories about founders who invest long days and nights without an appropriate payout at exit due to VC involvement

  17. 1

    I really admire the aversion to VC money. We've had a few (modest) investment offers at our small tech co-op, but refused them. Once you take someone's money, even a little, they own you and interfere in every aspect of the business (I've lived it, multiple times). I think we'll see this resistance more often as the tech job market contracts further and people are left with no choice but to start a business. Many of them aren't out to get rich; they just want to earn a living, and that is absolutely possible with a small SaaS (again, I'm living it).

    1. 1

      100% agree

  18. 1

    Really interesting read — I’m curious how you keep growing once you hit that kind of ARR plateau without outside money. Do you focus more on pricing, new features, or expanding the user base?

    1. 2

      Honestly, I’m not sure your current strategy will deliver the results you’re aiming for. While Universal Analytics has its place in e-commerce, I’ve found it often falls short for companies focused on product development. Tools like Mixpanel, Amplitude, or PostHog offer far better insight when it comes to user behavior and growth metrics.

      After 12+ years in this space and speaking with dozens of SaaS founders, I’ve consistently heard the same frustrations—UA just doesn’t move the needle when it comes to real growth

    2. 1

      There's really three ways to grow your MRR:

      1. Attract more customers (if you've maxed out your existing marketing channel(s) then it means you probably need to add another one)
      2. Increase average revenue per user (increase pricing or add higher tiers)
      3. Decrease churn (make the product more sticky)

    3. 1

      Once you hit $1m ARR you should be achieving viral growth from satisfied customers.

  19. 1

    Starting with smaller projects makes the iteration cycle much faster, also the lessons learned during that time become much more valuable for the future bigger project

  20. 1

    This resonates with me. Solo-building is no joke — appreciate you sharing this honestly.

  21. 1

    How many employees do you have? What's the team size?

    1. 1

      4 total. My co-founder and I plus two full-time employees.

  22. 1

    A masterclass in bootstrapping with purpose! Love how Snappa’s content flywheel and ‘start small’ philosophy built a sustainable business—even if growth plateaued. Your shift to GoodMetrics feels like a natural evolution, especially with GA4’s frustrations. Excited to see how this privacy-first analytics take unfolds!"

  23. 1

    Really enjoyed reading this, Christopher. The transparency around the growth plateau and your decision to keep things lean without VC is refreshing. The stair-step approach and focus on calm profitability really resonate especially in a world where everyone's chasing unicorns.

  24. 0

    I never imagined I’d be the kind of person who would fall victim to a cryptocurrency scam I considered myself relatively tech-savvy I had been trading for over a year studied the basics of blockchain and used two-factor authentication on all my wallets But as I learned the hard way sometimes even caution isn't enough My ordeal began when I came across what seemed like a legitimate investment opportunity on a social media platform The operation looked professional There was a well-designed website regular posts and what appeared to be a thriving community of investors I was initially skeptical so I started small Over time their communication and "returns" built my confidence Eventually I invested more—$240,000 worth of Ethereum and USDT across multiple transactions It wasn’t until I tried to withdraw some profits that things unraveled Suddenly all communication stopped The site went offline My wallet showed transfers to unknown addresses I never authorized The shock hit hard I felt angry at myself—ashamed even I contacted my bank and local authorities but there wasn’t much they could do since it involved decentralized crypto assets I filed a police report but I knew the chances of recovery were slim After a few days of emotional numbness and frantic research I began looking into cyber forensic services That's when I heard about Bytephantom Cyber Recovery not from an ad or flashy promotion but through a community forum where others shared their experiences What caught my attention was the way people described the process slow methodical and based on actual evidence not empty promises Reaching out to Bytephantom was a leap of faith but at that point I had little to lose What stood out from the beginning was that they didn't guarantee success They explained the technical complexity of tracing crypto assets through blockchain forensics the time it might take and what information I needed to provide wallet addresses transaction hashes correspondence with the scammers It wasn’t some automated fix—it was a real investigative process The next few weeks were emotionally taxing I had to relive the experience through emails and screenshots and answer a lot of questions from the team There were long periods of silence which tested my patience But every so often they would give me an update a lead they were following or a wallet they had traced movement to It was slow progress but it was real About two months in they informed me they had identified a chain of wallets linked to the scam Through collaboration with other cases and partnerships with certain crypto compliance organizations they managed to put a temporary freeze on a centralized exchange account holding part of the stolen funds After providing additional documentation and going through some verification steps I was shocked when I finally received a partial recovery nearly $150,000 Over the next few weeks they were able to assist with further recovery from smaller wallets that had previously seemed unreachable In total I recovered approximately $215,000 Not the full amount but far more than I ever expected Looking back I still carry the weight of the mistake But I also carry a lesson—on caution on the sophistication of online scams and on the reality of what recovery looks like Bytephantom didn’t wave a magic wand What they offered was transparency technical skill and steady support during a deeply stressful period in my life I share this not as an endorsement but as a testimony to the fact that even in a largely unregulated space like crypto there are still ways forward if you’re willing to be patient and work with the right people My case wasn't easy and the result wasn’t perfect—but it was honest and it gave me a second chance I didn’t think I’d have

  25. 0

    I never imagined I’d be the kind of person who would fall victim to a cryptocurrency scam I considered myself relatively tech-savvy I had been trading for over a year studied the basics of blockchain and used two-factor authentication on all my wallets But as I learned the hard way sometimes even caution isn't enough My ordeal began when I came across what seemed like a legitimate investment opportunity on a social media platform The operation looked professional There was a well-designed website regular posts and what appeared to be a thriving community of investors I was initially skeptical so I started small Over time their communication and "returns" built my confidence Eventually I invested more—$240,000 worth of Ethereum and USDT across multiple transactions It wasn’t until I tried to withdraw some profits that things unraveled Suddenly all communication stopped The site went offline My wallet showed transfers to unknown addresses I never authorized The shock hit hard I felt angry at myself—ashamed even I contacted my bank and local authorities but there wasn’t much they could do since it involved decentralized crypto assets I filed a police report but I knew the chances of recovery were slim After a few days of emotional numbness and frantic research I began looking into cyber forensic services That's when I heard about Bytephantom Cyber Recovery not from an ad or flashy promotion but through a community forum where others shared their experiences What caught my attention was the way people described the process slow methodical and based on actual evidence not empty promises Reaching out to Bytephantom was a leap of faith but at that point I had little to lose What stood out from the beginning was that they didn't guarantee success They explained the technical complexity of tracing crypto assets through blockchain forensics the time it might take and what information I needed to provide wallet addresses transaction hashes correspondence with the scammers It wasn’t some automated fix—it was a real investigative process The next few weeks were emotionally taxing I had to relive the experience through emails and screenshots and answer a lot of questions from the team There were long periods of silence which tested my patience But every so often they would give me an update a lead they were following or a wallet they had traced movement to It was slow progress but it was real About two months in they informed me they had identified a chain of wallets linked to the scam Through collaboration with other cases and partnerships with certain crypto compliance organizations they managed to put a temporary freeze on a centralized exchange account holding part of the stolen funds After providing additional documentation and going through some verification steps I was shocked when I finally received a partial recovery nearly $150,000 Over the next few weeks they were able to assist with further recovery from smaller wallets that had previously seemed unreachable In total I recovered approximately $215,000 Not the full amount but far more than I ever expected Looking back I still carry the weight of the mistake But I also carry a lesson—on caution on the sophistication of online scams and on the reality of what recovery looks like Bytephantom didn’t wave a magic wand What they offered was transparency technical skill and steady support during a deeply stressful period in my life I share this not as an endorsement but as a testimony to the fact that even in a largely unregulated space like crypto there are still ways forward if you’re willing to be patient and work with the right people My case wasn't easy and the result wasn’t perfect—but it was honest and it gave me a second chance I didn’t think I’d have

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