
The Marketplace That Deleted Its Own Currency
PP15.ONE removed its in-app credit system in August 2026. At the time, 5.56 million credits were in circulation. The decision was not about the credits. It was about what a self-issued balance implies for a platform that intends to move real money.
The marketplace, where users buy, sell and create digital land measured in square metres, had run on internal credits since launch. Users topped up an account, received a balance, and spent it. The model is conventional. For a platform planning to handle real payments, it is also a structural problem.
"A balance that users can top up and cash out is a deposit," says Philipp Piekos, founder of PP15.ONE. "It does not matter what you call the field. What matters is that it exists."
Financial regulation treats an entity that accepts funds from the public and holds them for later repayment as a licensed activity. An internal balance funded with real money and redeemable for real money meets that description regardless of the terminology applied to it. An internal audit of the platform's ledger reached the same conclusion in a single line: the custody is in the ledger model, not the transport.
The second argument was simpler. "Buying two square metres took four decisions," says Piekos. "Decide how much to top up. Top up. Wait for the balance. Then buy. Every one of those is a place where someone stops." A substantial majority of registered accounts never completed a purchase.
Money moves only at the moment of purchase, directly between buyer and seller. The platform holds no funds at any point. Users add a card once, subsequent purchases require a single confirmation, and Apple Pay is part of the design.
Apple Pay is not a footnote here. At fomo, a trading app launched in 2025, support arrived a month after release, and TechCrunch describes that moment as the one that changed the company's trajectory. The friction was never in the concept. It was in the form. "Someone typing out a card number gets a second chance to change their mind," says Philipp Piekos. "Someone holding down a thumb does not."
The mechanism was already in the codebase, in the secondary market where users transact with one another. The work was not to invent a model but to make it the only one.
The migration exposed defects that had gone undetected for months.
Credits were disappearing. On the primary market, a purchase debited the buyer and credited no one: not the seller, not the platform. A reconciliation of credits issued against the sum of all balances found 11,575 unaccounted for. These were internal credits, not payments, and no user was financially affected. It had still gone unnoticed, because no process was performing the comparison.
The platform was in two states at once. Purchases moved to card payments before sales did. For a period, buying charged a card while selling paid into a balance scheduled for removal.
Governing documents lag the product. The platform's terms still state that value cannot leave the system, while the code has been rebuilt so that sellers are paid directly into their own accounts. A rewrite is underway.
The broader lesson concerns verification rather than architecture. Credits went missing for months without triggering anything, because no process existed to compare the system's stated position against its actual one.
The migration is built, not yet switched on. The credit column still holds balances from before the decision, and real payments go live alongside the company formation. Users will add a card once, then confirm each purchase with a single tap. Additional payment methods are in development.
Cool project, and a smart call. Killing your own currency takes guts, most people would have kept it running and hoped for the best.
The Apple Pay angle makes a lot of sense too — one tap beats typing a card number every time. All the best with the launch! ist das gut ?
The friction argument makes sense, but the interesting test seems to be what happens to purchase conversion after the switch. Are you treating the migration as a payment-architecture change, or as a measurable bet on reducing checkout abandonment?
Architecture first — the balance is a deposit regardless of conversion, so that alone forced the rebuild.
The friction part is a hypothesis I can't test yet. Most registered accounts never completed a purchase, but I don't know at which of the four steps they stopped, because nothing was measuring it.
That's the next build: instrument, then switch, then compare. Doing it the other way round gives you a number with nothing to hold it against.
That gives you a clean before/after test. The step-level drop-off should make the migration’s actual impact much easier to see.